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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Inflation rates can differ across regions of mone-
tary unions. We show that in the euro area, the US,
Canada, Japan and Australia, inflation rates have
been substantially different in different regions.
For example, the price level in San Diego increased
by 9.1 percent between 1998-2013 relative to the
average while in Atlanta it decreased by 6.1 per-
cent. In the euro area between 1998 and 2011,
the German price level fell by 5.5 percent relative
to the average while the Greek price level
increased by 16.6 percent. The differences have
therefore been persistent, and particularly sub-
stantial in the euro area.
Inflation differences can reflect normal adjust-
ment processes such as price convergence or the
Balassa-Samuelson effect. They can also reflect
the different cyclical position of the region,
because e.g. in regions undergoing economic
slump and high unemployment, prices tend to
increase less. Different composition of consump-
tion can also explain different overall inflation
rates in regions. But inflation differences can also
be the result of economic distortions resulting
from segmented markets and insufficient compe-
tition. In the euro area, before the global crisis,
unsustainable demand and credit developments
were fuelled by higher inflation, which reduced the
real interest rates and thereby made borrowing
cheaper.
In normal times, the European Central Bank (ECB)
does not influence country-specific develop-
ments with its single interest rate instrument. In
fact, pre-crisis literature showed that the mone-
tary transmission to different euro-area countries
was comparable. In crisis times, liquidity opera-
tions such as MRO (Main Refinancing Operations)
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or LTRO (Long Term Refinancing Operations) will
be used differently by different banks depending
on the strength of their balance sheets and the
strength of the sovereign in which they have their
main activity. Yet, such measures only mitigate
failures in the financial system and help to
improve the proper transmission of monetary
policy. Asset purchases by the ECB could also
have different effects in different euro-area coun-
tries, because assets are not uniformly distributed
across countries. For example, French companies
have issued about half of all outstanding corpo-
rate bonds in the euro area, and almost half of res-
idential mortgage-based asset backed securities
(ABS) have been issued in the Netherlands. In
some other euro-area countries there was close to
zero issuance of such securities. Unconventional
policy measures can therefore have different
effects on different countries depending on the
chosen instrument. They are used to reduce frag-
mentation and improve proper transmission of
monetary policy but they can also influence the
area-wide inflation rate.
The new macroprudential policy tools are unlikely
to be practical to address inflation divergences.
Overall, the primary responsibility for addressing
unsustainable regional differences in inflation
resides with national policy makers and the EU
institutions responsible for surveillance. The ECB
should keep the average inflation rate close to two
percent so that inflation differences are possible
without deflation in some parts of the euro area. It
can use unconventional policy measures to steer
the area-wide inflation rate or address financial
fragmentation that hinders proper monetary
policy transmission, but it should refrain from
using unconventional policy measures to influ-
ence country-specific inflation rates.
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INTRODUCTION
Regional inflation differences are a common phe-
nomenon in larger currency areas. Sometimes,
these inflation differentials are persistent. The
mandate of central banks, however, refers to the
area-wide inflation rate, which is simply the
weighted average of the regional inflation rates.
The euro area is also structured that way: the Gov-
erning Council of the European Central Bank (ECB)
has clarified that it aims to maintain inflation
below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium
term for the area as a whole1.
The definition of one central policy goal is not sur-
prising: Nobel Prize laureate Jan Tinbergen formu-
lated the famous Tinbergen rule according to
which one needs at least one policy instrument
for each policy objective. Accordingly, a central
bank in a currency area could use its interest rate
policy to influence the area-wide inflation rate, but
it would need additional policy instruments if it
should take into account inflation differences in
the currency area. The question of the implications
of inflation differentials for monetary policy is
therefore also a question of what policy instru-
ments should be available to the ECB. In current
circumstances, the ECB like many other central
banks, uses more policy instruments to fulfil its
mandate. In addition, the ECB has been given
macroprudential policy powers, which could in
principle be used to address inflation differentials
if they are judged to be harmful.
Inflation differentials were noted and discussed
in the ECB and by academics prior to the crisis (de
Haan, 2010, provides a survey). Angeloni and
Ehrmann (2007) note that inflation differentials
are substantial with a standard deviation of
around 1 percent. Fendel and Frenkel (2009)
examine whether inflation differentials have influ-
enced the behaviour of the ECB since the launch of
the euro. They hypothesise that the ECB has been
less restrictive than euro area-wide developments
would dictate, thereby preventing deflation in the
low-inflation countries such as Germany pre-
1. Article 127(1) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU)
defines the primary objec-
tive of the European System
of Central Banks to maintain
price stability, but does not
present an operational defi-
nition. Such a definition was
set by the ECB’s Governing
Council: “Price stability is
defined as a year-on-year
increase in the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) for the euro area of
below 2 percent”. The aim of
close to, but below 2 per-
cent inflation in the medium
term is a clarification issued
by the Governing Council.
See:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
mopo/strategy/pricestab/ht
ml/index.en.html.
2. See the webpage cited in
footnote 1.
‘A central bank in a currency area could use its interest rate policy to influence the area-wide
inflation rate, but it would need additional policy instruments if it should take into account
inflation differences in the currency area.’
crisis. Beck, Hubrich and Marcellino (2009) show
that factor market distortions and other structural
characteristics were key reasons for inflationary
differences. ECB (2012) takes a similar view and
suggests that the mispricing of risk, overly opti-
mistic expectations and inappropriate national
policies play a role. However, ECB (2012) also
acknowledges that non-standard monetary policy
measures, not just national structural policy
measures, are needed to prevent disorderly
adjustments and to ensure proper monetary
policy transmission. An important theme dis-
cussed in the literature is the need to have a cer-
tain level of minimum inflation for the area as a
whole to allow for differences in inflation rates
without having some countries in deflation. Sibert
(2003), for example, argues that unexpected
shocks that tip a country into deflation might be
more costly than redistribution resulting from an
unexpected inflationary shock. Therefore, a cer-
tain minimum level of inflation for the area-wide
aggregate is warranted.
And indeed, while the clarification of the area-wide
inflation target does not refer to inflation differ-
ences within the euro area, inflation differences
are one of the three reasons given by the ECB Gov-
erning Council to explain the aim of close to 2 per-
cent area-wide inflation. This rate would allow the
ECB to “provide a sufficient margin to address the
implications of inflation differentials in the euro
area. It avoids that individual countries in the euro
area have to structurally live with too low inflation
rates or even deflation”2.
Inflation rates can differ for a variety of reasons
within a monetary union. Inflation can, for exam-
ple, be lower when the region in question is regain-
ing price competitiveness if the price level relative
to productivity is higher than in other regions.
Higher productivity growth can also lead to higher
inflation rates via the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
A weak business cycle in a particular region could
also reduce inflation relative to the area-wide aver-
age. Such developments are a normal part of
adjustment in a monetary union.
3. See for example, Garcia
and Wolff (2014).
For all these reasons, the magnitude, causes and
consequences of inflation differentials in a cur-
rency area have to be carefully analysed when
assessing monetary policy. In this briefing paper
we first compare the persistence of inflation dif-
ferentials between euro-area countries in com-
parison with inflation differentials within the
United States, Canada, Japan and Australia. The
final section assesses the consequences of such
differentials and their implications for monetary
policy.
THE MAGNITUDE AND PERSISTENCE OF INFLATION
DIFFERENTIALS WITHIN CURRENCY AREAS
Figure 1 on the next page reports the cumulative
consumer price inflationary differences relative
the average of the euro area for the initial 12 coun-
tries that joined the euro. Relative to the headline
inflation rate (all items) before the crisis, inflation
was persistently above average in Ireland, Greece,
Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal, and below aver-
age in Germany, Finland, Austria and France.
During the crisis, the differential increased initially
in Greece (partly due to increases in consumption
taxes), but declined later. There was a major rela-
tive decline in Ireland and a smaller decline in Por-
tugal, while in Luxembourg and Spain the
cumulative inflationary difference remained or
even increased further. Among the pre-crisis low-
inflation countries, there was an increase in Aus-
tria and Finland, but not in Germany and France.
The two major components of the consumer
basket, goods and services, show even wider vari-
ations in different countries and over time than the
headline index. Even the sub-index of durable
industrial goods, which includes items that are the
most exposed to foreign trade and competition,
shows very diverse developments in different
euro-area countries.
Within-country differences, including their per-
sistence, are somewhat smaller in the US and
Canada than in the euro area, and significantly
smaller in Japan and Australia (Figure 2). Taking
the US example, Figure 2 shows that the price
level in San Diego increased by 9.1 percent rela-
tive to the average between 1998-2013 while in
Atlanta it decreased by 6.1 percent. In Canada, the
increase relative to the national average in Alberta
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However, there are cases of persistent inflation dif-
ferentials, which can be a cause of concern. In par-
ticular, the first nine years of the euro was
characterised by rapid increases in prices and unit
labour costs in a number of euro-area countries,
which can be assessed as excessive. The persist-
ently high inflation and wage increases reduced
the real interest rate relative to other regions of the
monetary union, fuelling bubbles in some of the
countries. Such long-lasting divergence in unit
labour costs is often associated with significant
changes in production structures and current
account divergences. The corresponding build-up
of debt caused significant problems later.
Persistently falling inflation or even deflation in
some parts of a currency area can also lead to
adverse developments, in particular when private
and/or public sector indebtedness is high,
because it will become more difficult to service
high debt. When downward nominal rigidities are
prevalent in a region, low inflation or deflation seri-
ously hinders the allocation of production factors,
and unemployment can increase substantially.
Low inflation in a region increases the real inter-
est rate that borrowers in the region have to pay
because nominal rates in a monetary union are in
principle identical for assets with similar risk. The
problem is compounded when financial fragmen-
tation prevents the equalisation of nominal inter-
est rates for similar businesses in different
regions and thereby even the nominal interest
rate can be higher in a region facing low inflation.
The combination of low inflation and somewhat
higher nominal interest rates leads to substan-
tially higher real interest rates. The economic lit-
erature documents how such high real interest
rates undermine production and investment and
are a severe obstacle to growth and recovery3.
Differences in inflation rates in regions of a cur-
rency area can make the monetary policy sub-
optimal for many or even all regions (‘one-size
does not fit all’), even if monetary policy is optimal
for the aggregate of the currency area. Moreover,
when there are sizeable differences in inflation
across the monetary union, it is especially crucial
to reach the area-wide objective of 2 percent to
prevent some countries or regions facing too-low
inflation or deflation and the associated problems.
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unions. However, in Japan and Australia the
regional differences are much smaller. In Japan
the difference between the districts with the high-
est and the lowest inflation relative to the national
was about 8-9 percent, while in British Columbia
there was a fall of more than 6 percent during the
same period. Persistent differences in inflation
rates are therefore not uncommon for monetary
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
Sydney
Melbourne
Brisbane
Adelaide
Perth
Hobart
Darwin
Canberra
93
95
97
99
101
103
105
107
109
111 NY-Northern New Jersey-Long Island
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Atlantic City
Boston-Brockton-Nashua
Pittsburgh
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint
St. Louis
Cleveland-Akron
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Milwaukee-Racine
Cincinnati-Hamilton
Kansas City
Washington-Baltimore
Dallas-Fort Worth
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria
Atlanta
Miami-Fort Lauderdale
Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose
Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton
San Diego
Portland-Salem
Honolulu
Anchorage
Denver-Boulder-Greeley
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
108
110 Alberta
Prince Edward
Island
Nova Scotia
Saskatchewan
Newfoundland
& Labrador
New Brunswick
Ontario
Manitoba
Quebec
British
Columbia
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
98
99
100
101
102
103
Hokkaido
Tohoku
Kanto
Hokuriku
Tokai
Kinki
Chugoku
Shikoku
Kyushu
Okinawa
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
United States Canada
Japan Australia
Figure 2: Regional inﬂationary developments in US, Canada, Japan and Australia relative to the
national average (1998=100)
Source: Bruegel based on Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistics Canada, Statistics Bureau Japan, Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Note: Due to regional data availability constrains we use 25 metropolitan areas for US, 10 main provinces for Canada, 10 districts
for Japan and 8 state capitals for Australia. For Australia, the 2014 data is the average of the first two quarters of the year.
94
100
106
112
118
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
88
94
100
106
112
118
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
A: all items B: services
C: goods D: durable
industrial goods
Figure 1: Inﬂation developments in euro-area countries relative to the euro-area average (1998=100)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat’s Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) database.
4. Darvas and Merler
(2013) argue that regional
differences and macroeco-
nomic imbalances can
hamper the proper trans-
mission of ECB monetary
policy.
5. Figure 3 shows that the
greatest increase in US
regional unemployment
rate was about 5 percent-
age points, much below the
greatest value for the euro
area, which was 20 percent-
age points for Greece.
Therefore US developments
were less diverse. The coef-
ficient of determination
(R2), which measures the
goodness of fit of the
regression line, was 0.63 for
the euro area and 0.25 for
the United States, underlin-
ing that the relationship
was much weaker in the US
than in the euro area. Since
the peak in unemployment
was in 2010 for the US, in
panel B of Figure 2 we show
the increase in unemploy-
ment from 2008-10. If we
extend the sample period
for the US up to 2013, the
R2 falls to 0.05, suggesting
practically no relationship
and lower persistence than
in the euro area.
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average is 4 percentage points while it is 4.6 per-
centage points in Australia when looking at state
capitals. In Canada the difference in inflation
between the ten main provinces amounts to 13.7
percentage points, while in the US there is a dif-
ferential of 15.3 percentage points for the 26 key
metropolitan areas.
While in Canada and Japan these differences look
rather persistent, it is the opposite for the US. Most
US metropolitan areas alternate between higher
and lower inflation than the national average. In
Australia some state capitals have a persistent
positive or negative inflation differential relative
to the national average; others like Perth or Bris-
bane, however, switch between periods of positive
and negative inflation differentials. Darwin, for
instance, had the highest negative inflation dif-
ferential between 1998 and 2005, but this was
later compensated for by higher inflation, and in
the full period of 1998-2014 the cumulative dif-
ference relative to the national average was
almost zero. In the euro area, by contrast, most
inflation differentials had a rather persistent
nature between 1998 and 2013, with the notable
exception of Ireland. The cumulated difference
between the country with the highest rate
(Greece) and the lowest rate (Germany) was a
staggering 23 percentage points in CPI develop-
ments in 2011 compared to the base year of
1998. 
THE CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF
INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS
When prices and wages increase faster than pro-
ductivity in a region of a monetary union, signifi-
cant imbalances can emerge because of
deteriorated competitiveness. The higher inflation
rate drives divergence further, by making borrow-
ing cheaper in real terms and thereby fuelling
credit inflows and sustaining further demand that
again contributes to inflation. As a result, inflation
divergences can become quite persistent until
creditors start doubting the solvency of their
debtors4. Without a stand-alone exchange rate and
monetary policy, the correction of such imbal-
ances is painful and difficult. Financial constraints
can drive up nominal interest rates in the region
compared to the area-wide average, increasing the
real interest rate and pushing the region into a
cyclical downturn. The weak supply of tradable
goods and net exports further reduces growth and
increases unemployment. The cyclical downturn
and high unemployment in turn rebalances the
earlier inflationary divergence.
Regaining the lost competitiveness through price
and wage disinflation is a slow process. If wage
developments have gone unchecked for too long
and the loss of competitiveness is significant, the
tradable goods sector might have lost substantial
market share and the industrial sector is accord-
ingly weak. It might be difficult to regain strength
in this sector in particular if certain skills are lost.
Moreover, wages typically do not fall in nominal
terms because of heavy resistance from workers.
As a result, the adjustment speed is limited.
More worrying than inflation differentials, how-
ever, is the much more significant increase in
unemployment in those euro-area countries that
had higher inflation prior to the crisis (Figure 3 on
the next page). In the main US metropolitan areas,
unemployment developments were less diverse,
less related to pre-crisis inflation and less per-
sistent, while in Canada differences were even
lower than in the US5. This suggests that persist-
ent inflation rate differentials are a particularly big
problem in Europe’s monetary union. Other adjust-
ment mechanisms such as labour mobility or
financial and fiscal risk sharing, are less devel-
oped in the euro area than in the US or Canada,
which makes the inflation differentials more prob-
lematic for the euro area (van Beers et al, 2014;
Sapir and Wolff, 2013).
This situation raises significant questions for the
European Central Bank and in particular for the
conduct of monetary policy and macroprudential
policies. 
Monetary policy
An important question for the ECB is how to decide
on and implement monetary policy when there are
inflation differentials. In principle, monetary poli-
cymakers in a currency area (even when there are
different regional inflation rates) should base their
decisions on the average inflation rate and aver-
age economic developments. In changing a single
interest rate, ie only one policy instrument, they
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can also influence only the average develop-
ments, according to the Tinbergen rule. In fact,
before the crisis, monetary policy was found to
have roughly similar effects throughout the euro
area (Angeloni and Ehrmann 2003). A cut to the
ECB main rate therefore led to a roughly similar
lowering of the rate in all euro-area countries. Even
though transmission channels are different, the
work of the ECB showed that the overall effect on
inflation in the EU countries was comparable. Cur-
rently however, it is less certain if monetary policy
has roughly comparable effects on all euro-area
countries. While an empirical assessment of dif-
ferent transmission effects is difficult to under-
take in the current circumstances, there are a
number of reasons to think that policy transmis-
sion has become less even.
First, an important transmission channel for mon-
etary policy is the banking system. If the quality of
the banking system’s balance sheets is low, a
reduction or increase in interest rates might not
be transmitted to firms and households. As a con-
sequence, monetary policy would not have the
desired effect on economic activity and inflation.
Bank credit default swap spreads in different
countries suggest that the healthiness of bank
balance sheets differed and still differs in differ-
ent euro-area countries, and thereby the trans-
mission of monetary policy likely differs too.
A second reason for different effects in different
countries is that nominal interest rates have
reached the zero lower bound. As a consequence,
‘unconventional’ monetary policy measures such
as targeted longer-term refinancing operations
(TLTRO) purchases of asset backed securities
(ABS) and bank covered bonds have been
decided.
The take-up of TLTRO will likely be different in dif-
ferent euro-area countries, depending on their
access to private long-term financing options. So
far, the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the
two 3-year longer term refinancing operations
(LTRO) also channelled liquidity unevenly across
the euro area (see Figure 4). In particular, while
before the crisis banks in Germany relied exten-
sively on ECB liquidity, during the crisis liquidity
was provided to banks suffering from particular
stress, which were often banks in countries at risk
of low inflation. However, it is important to note
that the liquidity operations are not defined based
on geographic criteria.
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In terms of asset purchases, the eligibility criteria
cannot and should not include geographic loca-
tion. However, the size, liquidity and characteris-
tics of such markets are different in different
countries. For example, almost half of euro-area
residential mortgage-based ABS has been issued
in the Netherlands (the outstanding stock was
€250 billion in 2013Q4), while in France the out-
standing stock was very small (€10 billion)6. As a
result, the purchases will have different impacts
on different countries.
A third reason lies in the still remaining financial
fragmentation. While financial fragmentation was
much greater two years ago than now, there are
still differences in interest rates for assets of com-
parable quality. This fragmentation means that
policy signals do not get transmitted equally to
capital markets.
Monetary policy in current circumstances there-
fore can take into account the heterogeneity of the
monetary union, including inflation differentials,
because it employs more than one policy instru-
ment that can have a different impact in different
countries. However, the ECB’s primary objective is
to maintain price stability in the euro-area as a
whole and the ECB should consider regional dif-
ferences only to the extent that they have an
impact on its mandate. For example, when finan-
cial fragmentation hinders the proper transmis-
sion of monetary policy in some regions,
measures to improve the transmission mecha-
nisms are justified. For example, some central
bank policy measures are specifically targeted at
addressing fragmentation in specific markets. The
ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) pro-
gramme announcement was the most important
policy measure to address fragmentation. Such
measures are justified if they ensure the proper
functioning of monetary policy and contribute to
fulfilling the mandate of the ECB7. Also, when too-
low inflation or deflation in certain regions can
threaten the achievement of area-wide financial
stability, the ECB should be especially vigilant and
act, within its mandate, to minimise threats to
financial stability. For example, lasting deflation
in Italy would undermine public debt sustainabil-
ity, which in turn could have negative repercus-
sions for financial stability and inflation in the euro
area as a whole. To avoid deflation in Italy at time
when average euro-area inflation is well below the
2 percent threshold, the ECB should step-up
efforts to push average euro-area inflation back to
the 2 percent threshold in order to allow intra-euro
inflationary divergence without any country falling
into deflation. But the ECB should not try to bal-
ance inflationary differences, which are the
results of economic distortions resulting from seg-
mented markets and insufficient competition.
Overall, while monetary policy measures in
normal times only take into account the average
developments in the monetary union, in times of
crisis or financial fragmentation the impact of non-
conventional measures on different jurisdictions
must be considered. In aiming to fulfil its mandate,
the ECB has to ensure that monetary policy
transmission operates properly and that it
contributes to financial stability throughout the
union. In current circumstances, it is particularly
important that the ECB achieves its goal of an
inflation rate close to 2 percent in order to allow
the process of adjustment to go on without
countries that need to regain competitiveness
having to fall into deflation.
Macroprudential policies
The key question for macroprudential policy is if
the ECB should use some of its new macropru-
dential powers when inflation in a country
becomes significantly higher than the average
6. See a detailed examina-
tion of the outstanding
stocks of various assets
that the ECB could purchase
in Claeys et al (2014).
7. See Darvas (2012) and
Wolff (2013, 2014).
8. Macroprudential policy
can at best address credit
booms and high inflation,
but its scope is certainly
very limited in fostering
credit growth and reversing
low inflation during an eco-
nomic downturn.
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Figure 4: Use of Eurosystem liquidity (in EUR
billions, 01/2005 – 08/2014)
Source: Bruegel, updated from Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012)
using data from the ECB and national central banks. 
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inflation rate8. There is no easy answer to this.
Macroprudential policies can certainly play a role
in dampening excessive credit developments in
some regions and could thereby be used to
reduce inflation divergences from the average.
However, the ECB needs to be cautious and act
only when there is an objective risk or an imbal-
ance emerging. As we have argued, many inflation
developments and deviations from the average
are normal developments in a large currency area
and reflect underlying structural changes or
adjustments. The ECB is therefore confronted with
a significant information problem. It needs to
assess in real time whether a certain regional
inflation development is an equilibrium develop-
ment reflecting sustainable underlying funda-
mentals or whether there is a need to act
pro-actively, which is a difficult task. When using
country-specific macroprudential tools, the ECB
would face significant political-economy problems
as it would need to act against substantial national
interests. Overall, while macroprudential tools
would allow the ECB to address country specific
inflation rates, their practical value may be less
than is often suggested. 
In conclusion, we have argued that monetary
policy should above all ensure that area-wide
inflation does not fall below the 2 percent objec-
tive. This would allow the adjustment process in
terms of different inflation rates to continue
between euro-area countries, without any coun-
try entering deflation. Persistent deflation in some
countries would endanger public debt sustain-
ability and thereby undermine financial stability
and inflation in the euro area as a whole. The ECB
should use unconventional policy measures to
achieve the 2 percent area-wide objective and
also to reduce financial fragmentation and
improve monetary transmission in countries that
undergo deep structural adjustments in the wake
of too-high inflation in the past.
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